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2-23-March/1914
Pov of Paul von Hindenburg
"How do the Polish training efforts proceed?" I asked, watching Erich Ludendorff as he reviewed a set of reports from the front.
"The usual difficulties. Their willingness to fight remains low. We have received some fifty thousand volunteers, but beyond that we depend almost entirely upon compulsory conscription. In that regard, results have been more consistent. Including Russian prisoners of Polish origin who have come over to our side, we may gather sufficient strength to form a second Polish army by the end of the year," he replied, taking several documents from his aide.
I held a pencil between my fingers, thoughtful. "Then, with our present forces and the formation of the Tenth Army, we field approximately seven hundred and fifty thousand German soldiers and some five hundred thousand Poles on the Eastern Front."
Ludendorff gave a slight nod. "Closer to three hundred thousand Poles, I would say. The difficulty is not the number of men, but their equipment. Ammunition consumption is high, and industry cannot sustain this pace. Mauser is already at the limits of its capacity. It is likely we have reached the maximum number of Polish troops we can properly arm."
I reflected for a moment before answering. "We possess considerable stocks of captured Russian materiel. Rifles, ammunition, in significant quantities. We may employ them."
"It is a sound course," he answered without hesitation. "Many of the Poles are already familiar with such equipment. It would shorten the period of adjustment and allow us to reserve the Gewehr 98 for German formations, which remain the core of our offensive strength."
I inclined my head in silence.
The war had long since ceased to be a brief campaign. Any expectation of a swift resolution had faded as quickly as it had arisen.
The Western Front continued to absorb the greater part of our resources, as we attempted to correct the initial errors of the Schlieffen Plan. Meanwhile, our Austro-Hungarian allies failed to impose themselves in Serbia and continued to suffer setbacks against the Russians.
In the East, our position endured only because of the defeats we had inflicted upon the enemy on our own soil. Without those victories, Russian pressure upon East Prussia would have become unsustainable.
We had destroyed two Russian armies and brought a third to the brink of collapse in Poland. That restored the balance for a time, but it did not resolve the underlying problem.
So long as one of our principal allies remains unable to sustain its own front, each of our victories will remain, at best, insufficient.
What troubled me most was the ease with which many of the generals under my command had begun to accept these new methods. There was a growing willingness to employ practices that, in another time, would have been considered unworthy of a regular army, eliminating officers at hundreds of meters, operating in concealed detachments, relying upon selected marksmen such as the Scharfschützen.
I did not ignore their utility. The results were evident.
Even so, they remained forms of combat that avoided direct engagement. Yet we were in no position to reject them. Russia possessed a reserve of manpower we simply could not match. It was clear that, by the end of the year, they would have reconstituted new formations, perhaps even more than those we had already destroyed.
The war was changing. Not in our favor.
It was becoming a conflict in which position, concealment, and patience began to outweigh open maneuver. A war where the man who concealed himself best and observed most carefully held the advantage.
The Jägerkommandos had proven useful, yet I did not share the enthusiasm of Erich Ludendorff. Victory in Poland had not been the work of a handful of men hidden in forests. It had been the result of planning, coordination, and the effective use of intelligence, particularly through Austro-Hungarian networks and Polish elements seeking to desert from the Russian side.
Methodical advance, knowledge of the ground, and the proper employment of resources were the true reasons for our success in Poland. All of this carries far greater weight than any isolated shot fired from a distance.
Even so, these new formations were gaining influence.
That influence was visible even in Berlin.
Wilhelm II had shown increasing interest in expanding such formations. After reviewing recent reports, where our troops had begun to inflict steady losses upon the Russians in the trenches, he even considered transferring up to fifteen thousand men from the Western Front to be trained as Scharfschützen.
I could not ignore the effectiveness of these methods. The numbers spoke plainly.Yet I could not disregard the direction in which the war was moving.
It depended less upon mass discipline and more upon the systematic, silent, and distant elimination of the enemy. A form of combat which, though effective, sits uneasily with the traditional conception of war.
And much of this, in large part, stemmed from a single man. An exceptional soldier in his role, whose results had begun to lend legitimacy to what had once been dismissed without hesitation as an improper practice of war.
These methods were not born of military tradition, but of necessity and cowardice. Even so, success tends to justify what, under other circumstances, would have been rejected outright.
I will not deny that, when I sent him on his last operation, I considered the possibility that he might not return, that he might die in some forsaken hole beyond the reach of God, because men such as he represent a change many would rather not see take root. Even so, whether his plan succeeded or failed, the campaign in Lithuania and the Baltic could not depend upon a single individual. It would rest far more upon the discipline and organization of our forces than upon placing explosives beneath a bridge.
We must focus on what is essential, securing supplies, maintaining pressure, and stripping Russia of the territories under its control. Every region that remains in their hands grants them resources and freedom of action, while imposing an additional burden upon us.
I sought to coordinate a joint offensive with Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, with the aim of driving the Russians toward the lines of the Dnieper and the Daugava. On paper, the maneuver was sound.
"In practice, it became evident that the Austro-Hungarian forces were not in a condition to sustain an operation of such scale. Organizational shortcomings, linguistic divisions within their own units, and uneven discipline significantly reduced their effectiveness.
It was not merely a matter of planning, but of the capacity to execute what had been planned. In that respect, little could be done.
So long as we relied upon allies unable to hold their own front with consistency, the burden in the East would inevitably fall upon us. The campaign, therefore, had to proceed under our direction, at least until they proved capable of acting with the steadiness the situation required.
"What of the reports from the officers assigned to reorganize Polish industry? Mauser has already dispatched its engineers. I require clarity on whether they can adapt the local machinery to produce rifles or, at the very least, ammunition for the Gewehr 98," I asked, reviewing the documents concerning the factories now under our control.
Erich Ludendorff looked up from his papers. "The teams are already on site. The facilities that could be activated immediately are now operational. However, in Warsaw they have encountered difficulties. The machinery is not compatible with the modifications required for serial rifle production. Mauser's engineers estimate that the necessary adjustments will take longer than anticipated."
I tapped the pencil lightly against the table. "Then that process must be accelerated. We cannot afford an inefficient industrial base. Poland must be fully integrated into our war effort. Every factory, every workshop, must produce."
Ludendorff nodded and continued. "There are also measures regarding labor. Russian prisoners, once they have completed work on trench systems and the expansion of railway lines, will be transferred to labor camps. Recent conscriptions have created shortages in agricultural production, which may affect the harvest. In addition, unemployed Polish civilians will be sent to Germany to be incorporated into industry."
"Proceed," I replied without looking up from the reports. "But ensure that fortifications are completed before any large-scale transfers. We require secure positions to which we may withdraw should the offensive not unfold as planned."
I took up the typewriter and began drafting the necessary orders to organize the transfer of Russian prisoners and Polish labor to their assigned work zones.
As I did so, an officer entered at a brisk pace.
"Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, we have intercepted Russian Morse transmissions," he said, extending the document.
I cast a brief glance toward Ludendorff. His expression shifted at once. He understood the implications.
"Read," I ordered, settling back in my chair.
"The message states: bridges over the Daugava destroyed, railway lines in the same sector rendered unusable, Vilna–Pskov connection severed, Vilna–Minsk disrupted."
Ludendorff rose at once. "He has done it. He has isolated the Russian forces. We must act immediately."
I nodded calmly and turned back to the officer. "Anything further?"
"That is the principal content for now. Additional transmissions are still being deciphered. The Russians repeatedly refer to what they call the 'Devil of Masuria.' We do not yet have a complete picture, but efforts are ongoing."
I remained silent for several seconds.
"This will have consequences," I said at last, my voice low.
Without further remark, we began organizing the movement of our forces. Coordination with Józef Piłsudski was essential to exploit the situation and launch the offensive at the proper moment.
Intercepts continued to arrive.
Their communications network had suffered considerable damage. The cutting of telegraph lines was generating confusion within their own formations.
Among the messages, one drew particular attention. They spoke of the death of a Russian general, referring to the massacre at Vilna.
It was not an isolated report. It appeared across multiple transmissions.
Others offered rewards for the capture of the so-called "Devil of Masuria." Conflicting reports of his location also circulated, with units claiming to have seen him in different sectors, always accompanied by accounts of officers and soldiers found dead under similar circumstances.
I reviewed the documents without comment.
We launched the offensive in the days that followed, exploiting the general disorder that had taken hold in the Russian ranks. Polish units advanced at the forefront, and we penetrated rapidly into Lithuania. With the first prisoners came reports of what had occurred in their rear.
According to their statements, the commander of the Fifth Army had been killed. They attributed the act to Karl, the so-called "Devil of Masuria." Some claimed he had even left a letter taking responsibility. It was not merely the death of a general. They spoke of hundreds of officers and soldiers cut down in a single training ground, where, according to their accounts, a storm of fire had inflicted severe losses. Many died where they stood, and others vanished when a snowstorm, more severe than usual, shattered any organized attempt to hunt him down.
The initial information was incomplete. However, upon taking Vilna, we obtained more detailed documentation. Patrol reports, internal orders, and records confirmed that a systematic search had been launched for the "Devil of Masuria." Promotions were offered to whoever killed him, two promotions to whoever captured him alive, along with considerable rewards in rubles.
The advance through Lithuania was extraordinarily rapid. Many Russian units chose to withdraw without offering organized resistance. Nevertheless, they attempted to slow our progress with a counteroffensive in the southern sector.
The Polish army was redirected to that front, in coordination with the Ninth Army, to secure our main line. Meanwhile, the Eighth and Ninth Armies continued to press against an increasingly disordered retreat.
We captured thousands of prisoners. Many moved slowly and fell behind, unable to maintain the pace of withdrawal. Some managed to escape before our forces closed the encirclement, but a great number were left behind.
The offensive began to slow as we moved too far from our logistical lines. The thaw turned snow into mud, severely hindering movement.
By then, much of the Russian Northwestern Army had already withdrawn north of the Daugava River.
In less than a month, we had taken control of the entire region.
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